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 This project examined the operational effectiveness of meteorology and 
oceanography (METOC) decision support tools (DSTs). It consisted of a literature 
review, a limited survey of senior officers experienced with both METOC products and 
operational experience, and concludes with suggestions for future work.  The literature 
review focused on best practices and previous work to assess the operational effect of 
METOC forecasts.  The survey results showed that surface wind and seas continue to be 
important forecasts for military commanders.  Synthesizing the best practices for 
assessment of METOC effectiveness as well as recommended ways forward, this study 
lays out several suggestions for future work. Several of these suggested projects deemed 
to be less burdensome to operational users of METOC products could be started in the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. RE-STATEMENT OF PROJECT 
This project arose from a desire to collaborate between the U.S. Naval Research 
Laboratory, Marine Meteorology Division (NRL MMD) and the U.S. Army The 
Research and Analysis Center Monterey (TRAC Monterey). Personnel from the 
Meteorology Department at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) joined the project to 
provide additional perspective (including both civilian and military, and operational and 
academic viewpoints) and subject matter expertise. The authors consider this a pilot 
project that may lead to more extensive and beneficial studies in the future.  
As a part of the Navy’s “corporate laboratory”, NRL MMD serves the Navy, U.S. 
Marine Corps, and all of the Department of Defense (DoD) by creating and updating 
various numerical weather prediction models, Meteorological and Oceanographic 
(METOC) analyses, and tactical decision aids (TDAs), and/or support or environmental 
input thereto. As used to help make operational decisions, this report will refer to these 
products as Decision Support Tools (DSTs). TRAC Monterey provides analytical 
capability, focused on real-world military problems, with expertise in multiple areas 
including analysis and visualization of large data, simulation, operations research, 
leveraging human data sources, and decision-making analysis.  
METOC personnel and all others who provide forecasts and/or advice to decision 
makers need ways to gauge the impacts of their products, to assess when and how to 
change products, and to decide when to create new products. Although some robust 
methods exist to verify the accuracy of individual forecasts or forecasts systems, gauging 
operational impact of those forecasts (or derived products designed to present operational 
impacts of those forecasts) is much more challenging. In part, this is because the pace of 
afloat/deployed operations makes detailed recording of decision processes a low priority. 
Further, METOC impacts are just one of many factors that go into any commander’s 
decision making, and METOC information is discussed and decisions are made at many 
different times, places, and levels in hierarchies, with or without METOC personnel 
input, that are never documented. In order to overcome such difficulties, discussions 
between TRAC Monterey and NRL MMD considered assessing DSTs by analyzing user 
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interactions as possible, as well as a more holistic and operationally focused assessment 
of how Navy METOC influences missions, i.e., in planning and execution.  
B. OVERVIEW OF WORK 
The authors and NRL MMD agreed on a three-part approach: 
1. Targeted literature review  
This consisted of prior studies of operational effectiveness of METOC support by 
the Navy, U.S. Air Force (USAF), and civilian organizations (both governmental and 
private, as applicable). The focus was on METOC analyses, forecasts, and impacts 
predictions. Past results, and past methods for collecting and analyzing data on 
performance and impacts were of key interest. NPS MR Research Associate Professor 
Tom Murphree in particular has led several past METOC metrics creation and collection 
efforts, providing a solid starting point. 
2. Survey 
The faculty, staff, and students of NPS include active and retired members of all 
the U.S. military services. As such, they have extensive experience in operations and 
planning at multiple echelons of command. This includes positive and negative 
experiences with weather (and ocean and acoustic) conditions on operations, as well as 
the associated forecasts (or lack thereof) of those conditions. Thus, the survey was 
designed to assess performance and operational effectiveness of METOC products, as 
perceived by this (potentially) representative sample of the larger DoD population of 
decision makers.  
3. Roadmap for a future project 
NRL MMD and TRAC Monterey decided that initial efforts should take place 
before the end of calendar year 2018, to help inform NRL MMD discussions with its 
customers and sponsors in early 2019. Given the short timeline and project start late in 
2018, options for future work are included in this report. This report lays out several 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SELECTION OF LITERATURE 
Providing relevant information to customers has always been a goal of the larger 
Weather Enterprise, which includes government, military, and private sector 
meteorologists. As noted in Katz and Murphy (1997), collaborating with economists and 
decision science theorists, meteorologists have built a foundation of research into forecast 
verification, the value of weather information in an economic sense, and ways to apply 
meteorological information to decision making. The pace of this research accelerated 
with the announcement of the plan for a Weather Ready Nation (National Weather 
Service 2011), and since then there has been steady research and demonstration projects 
involving Impact-Based Decision Support Services (IDSS) in the civilian sector.  
Military METOC has always focused on IDSS due to the specific and unique 
missions of the military.  Military METOC also differs in scope and requirements from 
its civilian counterpart. Therefore, the focus of this initial literature review is on past 
thesis research at NPS on METOC impacts to operations, and metrics creation and 
collection. It also included a 2004 NRL technical report, and some civilian aviation 
weather-decision based research.  
B. METOC THRESHOLDS     
One way to examine the usefulness of METOC DSTs is by considering METOC 
thresholds. Weather and ocean thresholds (go/no-go criteria, or red/yellow/green, 
red/amber/green – corresponding to no-go/marginal/go) have been set for a variety of 
mission by commanders, at a variety of times. They are supposed to give both METOC 
professionals and their operational customers pre-determined indications of what 
forecasts are important and when that forecast is likely to impact operations. One such set 
of criteria is listed in Appendix A. These are from the 1999 version of the Joint 
Publication 3-59: Joint Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological 
and Oceanographic Operations.  
The JP 3-59 document and enclosed limits are considered unclassified with no 
limits on public distribution.  While by no means all-inclusive, this is a representative 
sample of the kinds of thresholds that METOC DSTs as a whole must address. As given, 
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these limits are mission-centric. However, for a METOC science and technology or 
research and development activity, it is also useful to re-sort the limits by METOC 
phenomena as is done in Appendix B. For example, rather than listing wind limits under 
both surface and aviation warfare Appendix B shows all limits within the wind category. 
This allows researchers to consider if the current forecasts of these phenomena are 
adequate, and/or if the forecast presentation (e.g., probabilistic instead of deterministic) 
should be changed or re-negotiated with the customers. Included in Appendix B are some 
comments on these criteria, how they relate to our literature search, and a note on 
whether a related metric is seen on the unclassified Fleet Numerical Meteorology and 
Oceanography Center (FNMOC) metrics page (https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil/verify_cgi/).   
C. METOC IMPACTS TO OPERATIONS LITERATURE 
1. Safety of operations 
The thesis of Martin (2002): METOC and Naval Afloat Operations: Risk 
Management, Safety & Readiness focused on what might be termed traditional naval 
weather impacts for ships at sea, or safety in port. He analyzed a set of 8000 reported 
mishaps to extract 166 of what he termed METOC related mishaps (MRM). Of the 
MRMs, almost 50% were associated with high winds and seas, and 37% involved rain 
(primarily in cases of Sailors driving to work). Ice and snow, fog, tides, wind only, and 
tropical cyclones were also noted, though at much lower frequencies of occurrence.  Of 
particular note, 139 of 166 (84%) mishaps were assessed to involve inadequate training 
on how to assess, manage, and/or operate in adverse METOC phenomena. In general, 
there was not enough information to determine what METOC support those involved had 
received with direct evidence that 8 of 166 and 15 of 166, respectively, did or did not 
receive a METOC brief. 
Cantu (2001) took a similar look at aviation mishaps and weather. Based on 
record keeping and available data at that time, he focused on 235 Class A (most injurious 
to personnel or costly in dollars) mishaps that involved aircrew error (from 1990-98). It 
was assessed that 19% of those mishaps were weather related. By polling experienced 
pilots on what courses of action they might have taken had they been in the mishap 
situation, Cantu explored whether if a perfect forecast had been provided to the crew, and 
the crew believed it, would the accident still have happened? By this methodology, 2/3 of 
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the weather related mishaps were judged preventable. Visibility was a factor in over half 
of the accidents, including for controlled flight into terrain.  
2. Other impacts to operations 
Klein (2005) wrote a very interesting technical report, just before the Hurricane 
Katrina related events in 2005. The report focused on the difficulties in setting Tropical 
Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (TCCOR; see for example, U.S. Forces Japan 2015) or 
sorties for Naval commanders in the context of four hurricanes that threatened Florida 
over a span of several weeks in 2004. Differing storm scenarios related to different 
decisions-under-uncertainty issues. Klein highlighted the types of uncertainty inherent in 
the forecast(s), as well as where he assessed that commanders could have benefited from 
uncertainty information. This report was written before some of the more probabilistic 
products used by Navy METOC had been promulgated, but the challenges noted echo 
similar problems that exist today. The author points out that for the sake of forecast 
continuity, in several cases only small forecast changes were made to pre-set format 
deterministic products – whereas the qualitative free text forecaster discussions indicated 
much more uncertainty. Busy commanders typically leave the reading of forecast 
discussions to their METOC support, and those METOC personnel have limited briefing 
time. Therefore, useful information about uncertainty was present but likely unused. 
Klein notes that winds > 50 kts and seas > 12 ft were and continue to be key forecasts for 
making decision in regards to tropical cyclones. Getting those forecasts correct continues 
to be a focus of effort for NRL MMD. 
Darnell (2006) focused on quantitative assessments of forecasts for the U.S. Air 
Force and their operational impacts and improving weather support for the war fighter.  
The particular focus was on Planning Weather Forecasts (PWF), showing that the PWF 
has a higher potential for making positive contributions to air operations than do Mission 
Execution Forecasts (MEF). This is important because Air Force Weather (AFW) units 
spend significantly more time on MEFs than on PWFs. In the case of air operations, the 
surface visibility, cloud ceilings and cloud layers caused most negative impacts, making 
these phenomena an important focus for research and training.  Results of this study 
found high levels of mission success even when forecasts were inaccurate, perhaps due to 
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aircrew and mission flexibility.  The study revealed a need for improved education of 
flying units on the nature and availability of AFW products. 
3. Metrics creation and collection 
Darnell (2006) also tried to expand on immediately preceding work by Butler 
(2005) for developing METOC impact analyses. Butler developed, tested (and even 
operationally implemented at NPS), an online tool to ingest METOC data and forecasts 
provided by the METOC detachment supporting strike and air warfare training and 
operations for the Navy in Fallon, Nevada. METOC personnel collected and entered 
METOC data into an open-source data base system at NPS, and a set of statistical tools to 
evaluate (metrics) the forecasts and data in terms of operations were developed. Hourly 
weather data collected included observations of Time, Wind speed, Visibility, Weather 
condition, Sky condition (cloud density and heights), and combined seas, as well as 
forecasts provided. Observations were converted into common categories of Red, Yellow 
or Green in terms of metrics developed by other NPS Meteorology thesis students. The 
goal was to quantify Forecast Accuracy (FAC), Probability of Detection (POD) and 
Number of Accurate Forecasts (NAF). An intended product of this effort was a final 
metrics report format that supports the needs of users (i.e., the METOC units and their 
operational customers), as users have determined as their needs. This does highlight the 
need for extensive customer involvement  
Callahan (2006) continued the work of Butler and Darnell. He proposed several 
metrics to properly evaluate forecaster’s capability, grouped into three broad categories: 
forecast performance metrics, operational impacts metrics, and impacting phenomena 
metrics. Forecast performance metrics (forecast accuracy metric, probability of detection 
metric, false alarm rate metric and bias metric) assess the quality of the forecast. 
Operational impacts metrics included received negative metric, mitigated received 
negative metric, missions placed at risk metric, mitigation rate metric, missions requiring 
mitigation metric, missions canceled metric and targets change metric. They describe 
“how information in the forecast and the actual weather phenomena experienced during 
the mission affected or could have affected operations.” Impacting phenomena metrics 
include mission impacting phenomena metrics, mission canceling phenomena metrics 
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and target changing phenomena metrics. “These relate individual weather phenomenon to 
forecast performance and impacted operations.”  
Callahan also highlighted some important considerations:  
1. The timely arrival of forecast materials. Sometimes a forecast may be too 
late for mission planning purposes but not mission execution.  
2. Having weather personnel present at mission briefings greatly benefited 
operators because they were able to get a detailed explanation of the atmospheric 
conditions and could ask questions as to how those conditions could affect their mission. 
This provided the operators with the necessary information to pre-plan contingency plans 
for varied weather.  
The metrics developed by Callahan were used to create a system to provide near 
real time metrics reports. The program went through several revisions until it reached a 
full-scale test implementation online. The work of Butler, Darnell, Callahan, and others 
under Professor Murphree at NPS determined that a metrics system is viable. 
Implementing this system does require a significant “buy-in” from both deployed 
METOC personnel and their supported customers.  This is the biggest barrier to its 
successful implementation. Darnell in particular found difficulty in getting pilots to 
provide information post-mission. If the NPS metrics system were to be re-invigorated 
and expanded, Callahan had several suggestions that still apply today:  
1. Development of a comprehensive METOC metrics program directed by 
CNMOC.  
2. The adaptions made to prior studies such as Darnell (2006) could be used 
in the sister services to refine their METOC capabilities. 
3. Development of a metrics system that combines mission planning and 
execution forecasted data. 
4. Continual integration of METOC data collection efforts. Being able to 
extract the data from multiple systems in an automated process without the need of 
outside assistance to be used in a METOC metrics program is beneficial to the 
community as a whole. 
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4. METOC and decision making 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) sponsored Robinson, et al., (2011) to 
examine the implementation of high-resolution deterministic forecasts in concert with 
procedural/coordination changes. Of specific concern was convective weather forecasts 
and air traffic control. The new system was intended to assist what were termed strategic 
air traffic decisions. For the FAA’s purposes, strategic referred geographically to the 
whole national airspace, and temporally to weather constraints 2-8 hours ahead of time. 
In support of this time scale, an 8 hour “radar-like” forecast was made available at FAA 
and airline dispatch facilities, with updates every 15 minutes at an ~3 km scale. Two 
items particularly stood out from the FAA study, in regards to NRL MMD’s desire to 
assess METOC product usefulness: 
1.  The product had been tailored to the customer needs i.e., using radar 
return products to understand thunderstorms is something air traffic controllers have seen 
before. Therefore, the new high-resolution forecast information was in that format. The 
lesson being: present a customer with forecast information in as close a format as to what 
they will experience operationally. The challenge can be to find that format. 
2.  In order to do a rigorous assessment, Robinson, et al., had to coordinate 
multiple “observation blitzes”. These included observers, well trained in the new forecast 
products and with familiarity with air traffic control, to be stationed “looking over the 
shoulder” of air traffic controllers in real time, assessing how the new product was used. 
This was a significant investment of observer effort as well as a potential distraction to 
the customer. 
An earlier, but revealing project is that of Lind, et al., (1994). This study 
illustrates a process for targeted presentation of METOC information. In this case, MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory, through the sponsorship of the FAA, was developing a data link 
application to provide graphical weather information to the general aviation pilot in the 
cockpit.  As part of the design process, a human factors study was undertaken to 
understand the impact of Graphical Weather Service (GWS) images on pilot actions.  
Twenty instrument-rated pilots participated in five hypothetical flights, one for 
training and four for data collection.  Ten of the pilots had moderate instrument flight 
rules (IFR) experience and ten if the pilots had extensive IFR experience.  Each pilot had 
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four hypothetical flights: two with GWS images and two without GWS.GWS images 
were available to the subject during the training flight and two of the four data collection 
flights.  Subjects were provided with relevant navigational charts and weather briefing 
material prior to each "flight." At three decision points within each flight, the 
experimenter told the subject the aircraft position and altitude, described the current 
weather conditions in the immediate vicinity of the aircraft, and asked the subject what 
action he or she would take. The subject could respond immediately, or seek additional 
information using the Graphical Weather Service (GWS) or via queries to weather 
dissemination personnel (an experimenter, who sat in the room with the subject, played 
that role).   
Pilots were asked to "think aloud" throughout the hypothetical flights. The 
experimenter recorded the subject's choices of GWS images, queries to weather 
dissemination personnel, and all comments made at each decision point. In addition, the 
subject completed a questionnaire at each decision to assess his confidence in his ability 
to assess the weather situation and to assess the usefulness of GWS as an aid in the 
decision-making process. Weather for each flight was different, but each included 
convection and/or threat of thunderstorms.  Locations of strong convection, precipitation, 
visibility and ceilings changed during the flight.  Pilots chose flight path deviations as 
needed. From written or verbal in-flight weather updates, the precise location of 
convection and precipitation was not known.  The forecast of “thunderstorms may form 
in the vicinity” did not provide specific convection location or timing. GWS radar images 
provided precipitation location information and GWS used three colors to depict the echo 
intensity levels for weak, moderate and strong-to-extreme precipitation.  The pilot was to 
infer the potential for turbulence from the radar images. 
Lind, et al., assessed that GWS had a substantial positive effect on the weather-
related decisions made by the subjects. With GWS, subjects could see the weather 
graphically displayed and could make informed decisions regarding whether to embark 
on a flight and regarding the need for deviations for weather avoidance during flight. 
Subjects' confidence in their ability to assess the weather situation was significantly 
increased when GWS was used. Subjects found GWS to be very useful and cost-
effective.  Pilots were enthusiastic about receiving graphical weather information in the 
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general aviation cockpit. There was no statistical difference between pilot responses 
depending upon pilot experience level. Data obtained from subject comments and the 
observations of the experimenters indicate that GWS was not used as the sole source of 
information in making a decision.  GWS was used to confirm, clarify, and augment 
information the pilots had from other sources. 
In a 2006 thesis, Cunningham used air-refueling scenarios to demonstrate the 
integration of probabilistic turbulence forecast guidance into the U.S. Air Force 
operational risk management (ORM) process. The overarching idea from prior studies 
was that if a user’s exposure to risk can be quantified and related to their risk tolerance, 
then better (more economical) decisions can be made. The associated Cost-Loss (C-L) 
ratio for the user of a forecast can be difficult to determine in DoD operations.  Therefore, 
instead of C-L, some forecast users make decision based on a more qualitative 
assessment through operational risk management (ORM). 
Mission planners may be able to describe C and L in terms of benefits and risks. 
For example, military planners balance risk with mission priority. Cunningham argues 
that for air-refueling scenarios with high and low C-L user ratios, ensemble-based 
probabilistic forecasts provided more value at Tau-24 and Tau-48 valid times than 
deterministic forecasts valid at corresponding times. For scenarios with middle-range C-L 
ratios, probabilistic and deterministic forecasts provided nearly-equal value at Tau-24, 
but probabilistic forecasts provided more value than deterministic at Tau 48. 
Szczes (2008) continued ensemble related and ORM based assessments. Her 
thesis attempted to account for uncertainty (ambiguity) in both the ensemble data and 
user risk tolerance for the decision input. Ambiguity was defined as the uncertainty of the 
uncertainty prediction, which can be conceptualized as errors bars about a probability 
forecast. Alternatively, ambiguity can be considered as the potential error in the 
ensemble’s forecast probability distribution function. To incorporate uncertainty into both 
the ensemble forecast and risk tolerance, the researcher created a decision input 
visualization tool for varying levels of risk intolerance, mission thresholds for turbulence, 
flight levels, and forecast hours. When applied to forecasting clear air turbulence for 
aircraft refueling flights, a deterministic output of the decision aid identifies large regions 
of “inconclusive” – where the results is neither acceptable risk (Go) or unacceptable risk 
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(No Go).  Using an ensemble-based decision aid, which accounts for ambiguity, the 
regions of inconclusive decisions were dramatically reduced. 
Palmer (2010) also looked at ensemble based probability. His thesis explored the 
value of stochastic forecasting through a series of operational events, in the context of a 
Strike Warfare campaign in the Weather Impact Assessment Tool (WIAT), a campaign 
simulator. Unfortunately, limitations of the WIAT tool prevented conclusive results and 

























































III. SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Appendix C lists the survey questions used in this study. NPS uses the 
LimeSurvey tool for these surveys (https://www.limesurvey.org/).  
A. DESIGN OF QUESTIONS AND SELECTION OF PARTICIPANTS 
As mentioned in the introduction, the population of NPS includes individuals 
presumed to have familiarity with METOC products and personal as well as command or 
operations/planning experience based on their current seniority and positions. This 
population has made operational judgements throughout their careers, both with and 
without adequate METOC input, as junior officers and in positions that are more senior. 
Senior officers (O-5 and above), on active duty or retired, from the Army, Navy, Air 
Force, and Marines from the faculty and staff were sought out for this initial survey.  
The opening questions of the survey regarded familiarity with the thresholds 
listed in an older version of the Joint Publication 3-59 (Joint Chiefs of Staff 1999). Note 
that all participants received a copy of these thresholds to read as shown in Appendix A. 
Although this particular set of thresholds is incomplete, this set covers a representative 
sample of air, sea, and land operations. The intent of such thresholds is for operational 
customers to tell METOC personnel what is important for a particular operation. 
Therefore, survey participants were asked if they agreed with these representative 
parameters, and if they received forecasts or products that included those parameters.  
The survey also included questions on how recently the participants had dealt 
with METOC products, and at what level of command they were at that time. 
Considering the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare, the space and time 
scales a commander typically cares about grow with seniority. For example, a senior 
aviator would have cared most about short term forecasts of wind, icing, cloud cover, 
etc., as a junior pilot planning a mission, just hours in advance. Years later, that same but 
more experienced pilot may be involved in planning an operation a week in advance and 
would desire products in a different format. Such a range of experience informs the 
answers for the whole survey. 
As noted in the Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command 




make use of probabilistic forecasts and pushing forecasts further into the future. 
Therefore, participants were asked about perceived usefulness, timeliness, and accuracy, 
as well as agreement or disagreement that METOC is important to planning. The survey 
also asked for input from the participants on if uncertainty information is useful, would 
they take a longer lead forecast even with greater uncertainty, and how much uncertainty 
they could tolerate for their operations. To close the survey, there were questions on the 
most and least useful METOC products, how much METOC training a participant might 
have received, and a chance to provide anecdotes or complaints. 
B. RESPONSE RATE 
Some of the authors informally socialized the idea for such a survey to a few 
senior officers on campus prior to the project formally starting, and received positive 
feedback. However, as of the time of this writing only 8 people had responded, with only 
5 complete responses. This was likely due to the timing of when the survey was 
distributed during the academic year. The final Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
approval was complete and the study team was able to send the survey in late December. 
Classes and exams were completing, and most at the school were preparing for some 
form of holiday leave. The team has re-contacted the invited survey participants, but this 
report is being written before new results have come in. The team will deliver an updated 
survey analysis to NRL MMD if it is able to get more responses, and if the new responses 
are particularly insightful. 
Of the five complete responses, three were from Navy Captains (O-6), one was an 
Army Colonel (O-6), and one had been a Major (O-4) in the Marine Corps. All but one 
had more than 20 years of active duty experience, and all but one had command 
experience (one at the O-5 level, and three at the O-6 level). In regards to training, all 
professed to have had formal meteorology training during their careers, two to having 
oceanography training, and none to having space weather training. 
C. SUMMARY OF RESPONSES 
As mentioned, the Joint Publication 3-59 is only one possible source of METOC 
thresholds. However, it was interesting that three of our five respondents were not 
familiar with that publication. As far as the forecasts that they have previously received 




respondent disagreed with the given limits for ship underway replenishment, saying that 
16 ft seas would be “red” in his or her opinion. Another respondent suggested multiple 
additional parameters for anti-surface warfare and anti-submarine warfare, although these 
may be present on other threshold lists. For flight operations, one respondent commented 
that ceiling limits are very mission dependent. 
In regards to lead times for products, the participants in this sample indicated that 
between 6 – 24 hours was sufficient. However, they would be open to increasing lead 
times for mission planning purposes. The scope of this lead-time increase is, of course, 
mission dependent. From a planning perspective, the respondents all indicated that if the 
forecast was not accurate at 72 hours, mission degradation is experienced.  
As to what they perceived as the most useful products, there was little 
commonality among the participants. The products mentioned were:  
1. Optimal Track Ship Routing (OTSR) and Operating Area 
(OPAREA) Forecasts 
2. Standard Flight Weather Briefings (DD-175-1) 
3. Real time updates on changing or deteriorating weather conditions 
4. Weather (winds, visibility and ceilings) 
5. Passive acoustic predictions for threat submarine frequencies 
In regards to least useful products, those listed were: 
1. General Forecasts 
2. Weather updates associated with areas outside of the area of  
responsibility (AOR) that didn’t include a divert airfield 
3. Times for nautical dusk and dawn (EENT/BMNT) 
4. Weather report in port 
 
The ending question of the survey asked for final thoughts. Again there was little 
commonality, consistent with such a small sample. One suggested changes to the 
provided thresholds to include more laser related parameters. In-person METOC 
assistance was noted to provide the best consumer experience, allowing for explanation 
of products. Better real-time communication of weather updates to fixed wing aircraft, 




to pick up clouds at mid to low levels, and creating three-dimensional views of 























IV. POSSIBLE FOLLOW-ON EFFORTS 
A robust examination of METOC product effectiveness on commander decision-
making, and associated outcomes, requires extensive data. Ideally, a future researcher 
would have unfettered access to observe decision-making at multiple echelons of 
command. In particular, the study team would especially want to see what sorts of 
METOC information a commander receives, the format of that information, and the other 
factors that a commander must take into account. However, it is rare that an operational 
command has time, space, patience, and ability to deal with extra and external personnel 
solely focused on metrics, engaged in intensive metrics collection. Therefore, the 
recommendations below are divided into those that might have low negative impact on a 
customer or commander, and those that would be more intrusive. As previously noted, a 
series of NPS thesis students under the guidance of Professor Murphree developed a 
prototype metrics system that would be an excellent starting option. This would require 
significant customer “buy-in”, at least to change standard operating procedures to include 
more data collection. 
A. LESS INSTRUSIVE EFFORTS 
1. Operational chat records 
Starting in the late 1990s and continuing until the present, the use of online chat 
programs for coordination and command and control has continuously grown across the 
military (Heacox 2004). Commands may keep records of chat exchanges, and these 
records present an intriguing source of useful information. Although an individual 
commander might not be in a chat room his or herself, their direct representatives 
typically are. The various chat sessions are a place where lower echelons can report 
METOC related problems or conditions to their bosses, and begin discussions on possible 
courses of action. Additionally, METOC commands and deployed METOC personnel use 
chat for coordination, de-confliction of forecasts, requests to subject matter experts, 
mutual advice, and general discussion. 
Chat records are ripe for text analytics. With carefully selected keywords, TRAC 
Monterey and collaborators may be able to extract and sort from records trends in the 




analysis would aim to identify the types of METOC related questions operational 
personnel ask. This would allow for such things as: 1) assessment of current METOC 
products and if they offer the kind of information desired; 2) if the information desired is 
available, do operational personnel understand the products they get or the briefings they 
receive; and 3) are there gaps between customers desires and METOC’s ability to deliver 
a product. Records might also expose persistent misunderstandings by supported 
warfighters or METOC personnel. Chat records are also valuable because they represent 
thinking and (virtual) conversations “in the moment”, and capture detail and nuances that 
might be forgotten in later debriefs. The records could capture situations that deployed 
METOC personnel or supported warfighters meant to report to someone, but did not due 
to distractions from operational pressures.  
As a first step, TRAC Monterey could data-mine all available historical files. This 
would help develop appropriate tools and keyword, and reveal past trends. Then as a 
follow-on, working with NRL Monterey, a real-time or near real-time tool might be 
possible. Depending on chat availability, an application could be made that would alert 
METOC watch-standers of questions and/or problems with METOC analyses, models, 
forecasts, or other products. For example, such an application might flag mentions of 
“limits” or “weather holds”. Ongoing analytics, possibly using artificial intelligence 
based techniques, could help reveal trends in negative METOC impacts to operations and 
perhaps even link with more traditional forecast/model metrics (see for example 
https://www.fnmoc.navy.mil/verify_cgi/ ). 
2. Logic models 
A recent study in support of the National Weather Service’s Weather Ready 
Nation (WRN) initiative suggested the use of logic models (Nadeau 2017). In this case, 
logic models are simplified flowchart depictions of how a forecast provider might think a 
customer would use their forecast. As a very simple example, an afloat Navy forecaster 


















Figure 1. Simplified Logic Model for Flight Operations Decisions 
 
However, multiple other factors may come into play. For example, lower echelons 
might ask for maintenance time instead of flying, or there might be operational reasons to 
fly or not fly unrelated to weather. In addition, an unfavorable forecast might lead to 
inserting steps into the decision process to check, several hours before the flight 
operations, if a forecast changes or if observations are matching the forecast – before 
finally cancelling flight operations. 
TRAC Monterey could collaborate with NRL MMD, along with personnel from 
Commander Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command to create a base set of 
logic models for how that group assumes forecasts or METOC products are used. Then, 
the study would ask METOC personnel recently returned from deployment to modify 
these naïve models to “how it was really done” on their deployment. Personalities and 
preferences of commanders and METOC personnel vary from unit to unit and 
deployment to deployment, so likely the end result would be an ensemble of logic models 
of how METOC information is used. Researchers would crosscheck these ensembles with 
the suggested chat log analyses. This could allow for updated and modified logic models. 
This might help NRL MMD and others to modify content of products, delivery timing, 
and distribution of METOC information.  
Large deviations from the naïve logic models may reveal when customer training 
may pay dividends in introducing new products, or better explaining and/or enhancing 
Commander 
Desires Flight 























the use of currently ignored products. Validated logic models across multiple mission 
areas could also be a valuable tool to show the return on investment (ROI) from METOC 
efforts. 
3. Additional analytics 
In addition to chat logs, multiple lessons learned systems exist within the Navy 
and the DoD. Although a valuable resource, these are not all in the same format. Though 
searchable by keyword, in general they are not easy for humans to sort through unaided 
due to nuggets of information, for example, buried within multiple types of reports on 
multiple events. In addition, as noted in the literature review, past examinations of Navy 
Safety Center aviation accident records revealed METOC related trends. Since that study, 
tracking of METOC related impacts to operations has improved. A recent inquiry to the 
Navy Safety Center yielded information on 846 accidents with some relation to METOC, 
from 2010 through late 2017 (K. Perry, personal communication, August 15 2017). The 
study team could apply text analytic techniques to all of these sources of information.  
Additionally, as previously proposed by TRAC, it may be useful to do an 
assessment of all DSTs supported by NRL MMD, be they hosted at NRL MMD or at the 
Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanography Center (FNMOC). TRAC and partners 
could assess the workflow and use of the DSTs as a whole. The study team would also 
focus on one or two specific DSTs for more in-depth analysis. The goal would be to gain 
insights into which tools are most used; how, when, where, and by whom are the tools 
used; and the level of interaction required by the user to obtain their final products. 
B. MORE INTRUSIVE EFFORTS 
As previously described, Robinson et al. (2011) used an “observation blitz” 
approach to track the usage, interpretation, and performance of a newly introduced 
product (a weather planning tool, by the FAA, for air-route planners). In that case, highly 
trained observers were “present at several FAA and airline facilities…” and “… 
observations at each facility were made simultaneously in order to better understand the 
coordination and collaboration interactions associated with strategic weather impact 
mitigation planning.” Such intense efforts have also occurred within the last 15 years 
within Navy METOC (J. Feldmeier, personal communication, 2019). However, they are 




crowded, vessels for highly skilled personnel, who are not present to aid the observed 
unit’s mission. Such Naval efforts have also focused on the introduction of experimental 
products, which given operational pressures an intended customer may push aside in 
favor of existing products they are more comfortable with. Therefore, any naval METOC 
observation blitz should be rare and very specific. However, other data gathering options 
exist. 
1. Surveys 
Although the study team received limited responses from the survey at NPS, this 
was likely due to the timing (i.e., the survey was approved and released days before 
Christmas, leading to invited participants overlooking or forgetting the survey). The 
general design of the survey, both kinds of questions and intended audience 
(commanding officers, former commanding officers, and/or those with significant 
operations and planning experience) should provide useful data. A second effort could 
explore the procedure and permissions required to invite a much larger audience to the 
survey. For example, the study team could invite large numbers of personnel stationed at 
the Pentagon to participate. Alternatively, the team could invite large segments from the 
shore commands (presumably staffed by personnel with recent relevant operational 
experience, who since not deployed would have time available to give a survey serious 
thought) associated with Naval Aviation, Special Warfare, the Submarine Force, the 
Surface Force, Expeditionary Forces, and others. Future work should also examine U.S. 
Marine Corps needs, as well as seeking out joint examples. Surveying the (more junior) 
student population at NPS is also an option. 
2. Active monitoring and polling 
If not already active, develop across all domains an automated complaints / 
comments / suggestions data gathering application. For example, many METOC products 
have text to identify where they were created, and include a forecaster’s name with some 
sort of contact information. When a customer clicks on such a “problem” or “contact” 
link, rather than simply opening Microsoft Outlook for an email to a watch stander, either 
an additional metrics collection email could be auto-included or the customer could be 
directed to a comment system like those typically used by information technology 




among other techniques, to help sort data, look for trends in problems, complaints or 
questions, and indicate areas for improvement. 
Taking inspiration from the business world, if information assurance policies 
allow it, one could also randomly ask customers for voluntary feedback. For example, for 
every twentieth unique user to access tsunami-warning graphics from the Joint Typhoon 
Warning Center, a pop-up window or some other interaction could occur asking that 
customer to leave a comment or answer a brief survey. This would have to be voluntary, 
and designed in such a way as to have minimal impact and annoyance for the customer. 
3. Improved tools and procedures for deployed METOC Personnel 
NRL MMD supports the Navy in general, but often through deployed METOC 
personnel. Thus, the customer, or “the warfighter” for deployed METOC is usually pilots, 
SEALs, ship captains, admirals, etc. For NRL MMD, sometimes the terms “customer” or 
“warfighter” evokes the deployed (or on operational watches ashore) METOC personnel 
(J. Hansen, personnel communication, 2017). There is an opportunity, however, for NRL 
MMD and deployed METOC, with direction and coordination with CNMOC, to develop 
and improve data collection and metrics to measure METOC effectiveness. As a simple 
example of a process improvement, consider the following based on the heavy use of 
email underway for a Strike Group Oceanography Team (SGOT), deployed on a carrier 
or large-deck amphibious ship: 
First, train watch standers and supervisors to save an (ideally) shared email 
archive file. This would contain all service requests, questions, and complaints they 
received by email at that watch station. Also, train the watch to forward to that archive 
any existing pass-down log documents, or a summary email written by them (once a 
watch) of customer interactions they had in person or by phone. METOC personnel who 
provide direct staff or planning support, such as a strike forecaster or a strike group 
oceanographer, could also be trained send to that shared email a summary of their daily 
activities. Then daily, weekly, monthly, and at the end of a deployment or exercise run 
text analytics on that email archive, again to help expose trends. Although deployed 
METOC might find such tasking annoying at first, and likely the record would be 
incomplete, with time such a procedure would become a normal part of underway work 




Additional methods of automated data collection are possible. However, in the 
near term, NRL MMD may be able to collaborate with an existing program. Over the past 
few years, although FNMOC is not a deploying command, the FNMOC Reach Back Cell 
occasionally sends subject matter experts to meet units on deployment to help them better 
understand available METOC products and procedures. On a not to interfere basis with 
their FNMOC tasking, these temporary ship riders could observe or collect metrics on 
how METOC products are used. Admittedly, it would likely take several attempts to 
come up with a reasonable (and small) set of questions, requests, or observations for 


























































It is not always straightforward to measure METOC effectiveness. From the 
standpoint of what METOC parameters to focus on, Appendix B provides a good starting 
point. From surveys of senior military officers, surface wind and seas continue to be 
important. Training customers to write their thresholds probabilistically would be of 
interest. Various flight parameters such as ceiling, cloud cover, icing, and visibility also 
remain challenging, as do thunderstorms. Particular attention should be paid to presenting 
products in formats and with a level of precision that meets customer needs – or if the 
precision requested is not realistic, more discussion with customers on what is possible 
should be held. 
To understand if a forecast is useful, the study team would have to be able to 
assess if it is correct and how it is used. The academic and modeling communities have 
understandably focused on metrics for gauging quantitative correctness of numerical 
forecasts. However, the various ideas examined above for such things as operational 
impacts metrics and impacting phenomena metrics have merit and should be re-
examined. As Callahan (2006) pointed out, some of this should be done at the CNMOC 
level with NRL input. In fiscal year 2019, NRL MMD should continue to collaborate 
with TRAC on implementing some or all of the suggested “less intrusive” options, and 





































Reproduction of Appendix G, Joint Publication 3-59 (1999) 











BRIDGING WIND < 10 KTS WIND 10-34 KTS WIND > 34 KTS 
ARMOR GUN SIGHTS VIS > 2000 m VIS 1000-2000 m VIS < 1000 m 
TOW MISSILE VIS > 3000 m VIS 2000-3000 m VIS < 2000 m 
HELICOPTER (LIFT) CIG > 500 FT CIG 300-500 FT CIG < 300 FT 
(no specific airframe) VIS > 1600 m VIS 800-1600 m VIS < 800 m 
 NO ICG/TURBC LGT OR MDT SVR TURBC/ICG 
  TURBC OR ICG  
HELICOPTER (ATTACK) CIG > 2600 FT CIG 1100-2600 FT CIG < 1100 FT 
(no specific airframe) VIS > 4000 m VIS 1000-4000 m VIS < 1000 m 
 WIND < 25 KTS WIND 25-50 KTS WIND > 40 KTS 
   TEMP > 90F 
 NO PRECIP MDT PRECIP HVY PRECIP 
 NO Thunderstorms FEW Thunderstorms SCT Thunderstorms 
HELLFIRE MISSILE CIG > 2000 FT CIG 800-2000 FT CIG < 800 FT 
 VIS > 5000 m VIS 3000-5000 m VIS < 3000 m 
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT CIG > 2000 FT CIG 1000-2000 FT CIG < 1000 FT 
(For Army Planning 
Purposes) 
VIS > 8000 m VIS 3200-8000 m VIS < 3200 m 
AERIAL RECON < 2/8 CLD COVER 2/8-4/8 CLD COVER > 4/8 CLD COVER 
 VIS > 8000 m VIS 4800-8000 m VIS < 4800 m 
 Aerial Recon covers three levels — Strategic (above 25,000 ft), 
High (8,000 - 25,000 ft), and Low (below 3,000 ft). 
Cloud cover is for at or below flight (operating) level. 
 
 
GROUND RECCE VIS > 3000 m VIS 1000-3000 m VIS < 1000 m 
PARADROP WIND < 13 KTS WIND 13-18 KTS WIND > 18 KTS 
   CIG < 1000 FT 
  LGT PRECIP MDT/HVY PRECIP 
 DA < 4000 FT DA 4000-6900 FT DA > 6900 FT 
 (DA = Density Altitude) 
NBC OPERATIONS  WIND < 10 KTS WIND > 30 KTS 
   WIND CALM 
   Wind From Enemy 
 Stable Atmosphere Neutral Stability Unstable Atmosphere 
 NO PRECIP LIGHT PRECIP MDT/HVY PRECIP 
SMOKE  WIND 5-10 KTS WIND < 5 KTS 
   WIND > 19 KTS 
   Wind From Enemy 
   TEMP > 120 F 




















ARFOR OPERATIONS (cont’d) 
PERSONNEL NO PRECIP LIGHT PRECIP MDT PRECIP 
(temp — heat and/or wind 
chill indices) 
> 20F and < 85F 85-95F or -15 to 20F > 95F or < -15F 
Lock On Before Launch CIG > 1900 FT CIG 400-1900 FT CIG < 400 FT 
 VIS > 7000 m VIS 500-7000 m VIS < 500 m 
Lock On After Launch CIG > 1700 FT CIG 800-1700 FT CIG < 800 FT 
 VIS > 7000 m VIS 1700-7000 m VIS < 1700 m 
COPPERHEAD CIG > 3000 FT CIG 1000-3000 FT CIG < 1000 FT 
 VIS > 2500 m VIS 1000-2500 m VIS < 1000 m 
 NO PRECIP MDT PRECIP HEAVY PRECIP 
SEA PORTS WIND < 20 KTS WIND 20-35 KTS WIND > 35 KTS 
AIR PORTS CIG > 1500 FT CIG 200-1500 FT CIG < 200 FT 
 VIS > 4800 m VIS 900-4800 m VIS < 900 m 
AIR DEFENSE CIG > 5000 FT CIG 2500-5000 FT CIG < 2500 FT 
 VIS > 5000 m VIS < 5000 m  
   TEMP > 120F 
ARTILLERY FIRES CIG > 1500 FT CIG 600-1500 FT CIG < 600 FT 
 VIS > 3000 m VIS 1000-3000 m VIS < 1000 m 
 WIND < 30 KTS WIND 30-35 KTS WIND > 35 KTS 
   TEMP < 20F 
   TEMP > 125F 
 NO TO LGT PRECIP MDT PRECIP HVY PRECIP 
SIGINT WIND < 30 KTS WIND 30-45 KTS WIND > 45 KTS 
  TEMP 85-120F TEMP < 32 F 
   TEMP > 120F 
TRAFFICABILITY NO PRECIP MDT PRECIP HVY PRECIP 
AFFOR OPERATIONS 
AIRLIFT CIG > 1000 FT CIG 500-1000 FT CIG < 500 FT 
(no specific airframe) VIS > 8000 m VIS 4800-8000 m VIS < 4800 m 
  Light Freezing Precip Freezing Precip which 
closes runway 
FLIGHT OPERATIONS CIG > 3500 FT CIG 1000-3500 FT CIG < 1000 FT 
(CAS and/or DEEP 
ATTACK) 
VIS > 3200 m VIS 1600-3200 m VIS < 1600 m 
(no specific airframe) WIND < 25 KTS WIND 25-35 KTS WIND > 35 KTS 
  LTG-MDT TURBC SVR TURBC 
ELECTRO-OPTIC SUPPORT CIG CLR-SCT CIG BKN CIG OVC 
(Absolute Humidity Limitations) < 14 g/m3 14-18 g/m3 > 18 g/m3 
(Transmittance) > .4 0.2-0.4 < 0.2 
(Moon Illumination)  Moonrise/Moonset No Moon 






















AFFOR OPERATIONS (cont’d) 
PREDATOR CIG > 2000 FT CIG 800-2000 FT CIG < 800 FT 
 VIS > 4800 m VIS 3200-4800 m VIS < 3200 m 
 Crosswind < 10 KTS Crosswind 10-15 KTS Crosswind > 15 KTS 
AIR REFUELING NO CLOUDS AT 
FLIGHT LEVEL 
SCT-BKN CLOUDS AT 
FLIGHT LEVEL 
OVERCAST CLOUDS AT 
FLIGHT LEVEL 
 NO Thunderstorms FEW Thunderstorms SCT Thunderstorms 
NAVFOR OPERATIONS 
AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE CIG > 5000 FT CIG 300-5000 FT CIG < 300 FT 
 VIS > 4800 m VIS 1000-4800 m VIS < 1000 m 
LANDING CRAFT    
(Combined Seas)   > 5 FT 
(Percent Illumination)   > .0001 FT CANDLES 
(Moderate Surf Index) < 8 8-10 > 10 
(Breaker Heights) < 5 FT 5-12 FT > 12 FT 
(Wake Period) > 7 SECONDS 6-7 SECONDS < 6 SECONDS 
ANTI-SURFACE WARFARE    
Over the Horizon — Targeting NO/LGT PRECIP MDT PRECIP HVY PRECIP 
   TEMP > 103F 
(Seas) < 6 FT 6-8 FT > 8 FT 
   WIND > 60 KTS 
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT   VIS < 400 m 
(Combined Seas) < 12 FT 12-19 FT > 19 FT 
MINE WARFARE AVIATION   CIG < 300 FT 
   VIS < 1000 m 
 WIND < 25 KTS WIND 25-35 KTS WIND > 35 KTS 
EOD DIVERS  CURRENT 1-2 KTS CURRENT > 2 KTS 
(Combined Seas) < 3 FT 3-5 FT > 5 FT 
HUNT WIND < 20 KTS WIND 20-30 KTS WIND > 30 KTS 
(Combined Seas) < 3 FT 3-5 FT > 5 FT 
SWEEP < 3 FT 3-6 FT > 6 FT 
Compiled from a combination of manuals, including FM 34-81, FM 34-81-1, Service manuals, and various 
equipment technical orders to present a general picture of METOC impacts to operations.  This list is not all- 
inclusive, nor is it intended to restrict SMOs and/or JMOs to these limitations.  SMOs and JMOs should feel 
free to use this list as a baseline, expanding or changing it as needed to suit the forces and limitations of 














































site Summary and Comments 
WIND 
  5-10 kts 
< 5 kts or > 19 
kts, or wind 
from target 
area 




ships at sea. Cantu 
(2001) found 16% 
of a set of aircraft 
mishaps related to 
wind. Klein (2005) 
focused on >50 kt 
wind 
predictability, at 






may be sufficient 













These thresholds show that 
various commanders desire 
wind forecasts to an accuracy of 
about 0.5 m/s or 1 kts from 0-60 
kts, whereas historically 
operational forecasters typically 
consider a wind forecast 
verified if it is within +/- 5 kts. 
Therefore, for example, a field 
forecast of 15 kts might verify as 
correct at < 13 or > 18 kts, 
spanning the red/yellow/green 
criteria for paradrop. Of note, 
since circa 2014 the Navy TAF 
verification program (adapted 
from the National Weather 
Service)  typically uses +/- 2 kts 
for wind verification (with wind 
forecasts given in 5 kt 
increments; Fleet Weather 
Center San Diego, personal 
communication, 2017). This may 
be a case where a customer 
could be asked to set 
probabilistic thresholds. Typical 
wind probability products show 
probability of exceedance of a 
given speed, in increments of 5 
  < 10 KTS 
> 30 kts, or 
wind calm, or 
wind from 
target area 
NBC   
Crosswind < 10 kts Crosswind 10-15 kts 
Crosswind > 15 
kts 
UAS 
operations   
< 10 kts 10-34 kts > 34 kts Bridging   
< 13 kts 13-18 kts > 18 kts Paradrop   
< 20 kts 20-30 kts > 30 kts  
Naval 
minehunting   
< 20 kts 20-35 kts > 35 kts 
Sea port 
operations   
< 25 kts 25-35 kts > 35 kts 













red is as 
written 















kts, usually staring at 20 kts, so 
in this case a probability of 
exceedance for something like 
13 kts might be more 
appropriate. It would also be of 
benefit if the criteria could be 
calibrated to forecast length, 
e.g., perhaps 40% chance of > 
13 kt winds would be in the 
"yellow" range for a 72 hour 
forecast, but in a "green" or 
"red" range for a 12 hour 
forecast. 
VISIBILITY 
> 1600 m  800-1600 m < 800 m 
Helicopter 
(lift)   
Cantu (2001) 
found visibility to 
be a factor in over 




visibility as one of 
three elements 









Terminal Aerodrome Forecasts 
report visibility in increments of 
100 m (see for example 
NAVMETOCCOMINST 3143.1H). 
However, for forecast validation 
and verification, MOS visibility 
categorical levels are used, that 
have at best a resolution of 1/2 
nm (Fleet Weather Center San 
Diego, personal communication, 
2017). Model Output Statistics 
(MOS) are typically very useful 
to aviation forecasters, but that 
is typically only in CONUS. This 
is consistently considered a hard 
forecast element.  May wish to 
> 2000 m 1000-2000 m < 1000 m 
Armor gun 
sights   
> 2500 m 1000-2500 m < 1000 m Copperhead   





> 3000 m 2000-3000 m < 2000 m TOW Missile   
> 3200 m 1600-3200 m < 1600 m 
CAS or Deep 
attack   
> 4000 m 1000-4000 m < 1000 m 
Helicopter 
(attack)   




> 4800 m 1000-4800 m < 1000 m 
Amphibious 
warfare   
consider a more integrated 
aerosol and hydrometeor 
combined product, vice more 
separate forecast techniques 
(i.e., aerosol surface visibility is 
available on WxMap). 
> 4800 m 3200 - 4800 m  < 3200 m Predator   
> 5000 m 3000-5000 m < 3000 m 
Hellfire 
missile   
> 5000 m < 5000 m   Air defense   





> 7000 m 1700-7000 m < 1700 m 
Lock on 
after launch   












> 500 ft 300-500 ft < 300 ft 
Helicopter 
(lift)   
Darnell (2006) 
noted cloud 
ceilings as one of 
three elements 





cloud cover was 







base on RH 
threshold 
METEOGRAMS available on 
demand; possible area where 
NRL MMD might want to 
consider some aggregate metric 
of the elements that go into a 
ceiling forecast on some 
geographic scale. Typically, TAFs 
forecast changes in ceiling down 
to 100 ft increments. 
> 1000 ft  500-1000 ft < 500 ft Airlift   
> 1500 ft  200-1500 ft < 200 ft Air ports   
> 1500 ft  600-1500 ft < 600 ft Artillery   
> 1700 ft  800-1700 ft < 800 ft 
Lock on 
after launch   
















> 2600 ft 1100-2600 ft < 1100 ft 
Helicopter 
(attack)   




> 3500 ft 1000-3500 ft < 1000 ft Flight ops   
> 5000 ft  300-5000 ft < 300 ft 
Amphibious 
warfare   
> 5000 ft 2500-5000 ft < 2500 ft Air defense   
CLOUD COVER 
< 2/8 2/8 - 4/8 > 4/8 Aerial Recon   Darnell (2006) 
noted cloud layers 
as one of three 
elements causing 




comments See ceiling comments 
CLR-SCT BKN OVC EO Support   
No clouds at flight 
level 
SCT-BKN clouds at 
flight level 
OVC at flight 
level 
Aerial 
refueling   
ICING 
None LGT or MDT SVR 
Helicopter 
(lift)   
Cantu (2001) 
found icing  to be 
a factor in 3% of a 




See ceiling comments; noted 
cloud ice an option for some 
models via METCAST 
TURBULENCE 
None LGT or MDT SVR 
Helicopter 
(lift)   Cantu (2001) 
found turbulence  
to be a factor in 
2% of a set of 
aviation mishaps. 
No, though CAT 
product available 
in METCAST - 
very difficult to 
verify except via 
PIREPs 
Navy forecasters typically begin 
with USAF forecasts products 
and modify as necessary 
  LGT or MDT SVR 






> 20F and < 85F 85 to 95F or -15 to 20F > 95F or < -15F Personnel   
  
Relatively robust 
at synoptic and 
mesoscale level, 
at 2m height and 
a few levels 
Duration of temperature may 
be important as well, possibly 
an area for a probabilistic 
threshold at longer lead times. 
   85 to 120F < 32F or >120F SIGINT   
    > 90F 
Helicopter 
(attack)   
    > 103F Navy ASUW   
    > 120F Air defense   
    < 20F or > 125F Artillery   







precipitation  to 




time and space 
Probabilistic criteria may be 
useful here based on QPF and 
re-negotiation with operational 












of a set of aviation 
mishaps. 
resolution may 















Airlift   
    HVY EO support   
THUNDERSTORMS 








thunderstorms  to 
be a factor in 3% 
of a set of aviation 
mishaps. 
No model 
derived CAPE or 




Difficult to provide verifiable 
products away from CONUS or 
in open sea 
DENSITY 
ALTITUDE 
< 4000 ft 4000-6900 ft > 6900 ft 
Paradrop   
Cantu (2001) 
found density 
altitude  to be a 
factor in 5% of a 
set of aviation 
mishaps. 
Not noted   
ATMOSPHERIC 
STABILITY Stable Neutral Unstable NBC     Not noted   
ABSOLUTE 
HUMIDITY < 14 g/m3 14-18 g/m3 > 18 g/m3 
EO Support   
  
Not noted Relative humidity more typical for typical Navy forecaster 
TRANSMITTANCE > 0.4 0.2-0.4 < 0.2 EO Support     Not noted   
ILLUMINATION 
  Moonrise/Moonset No Moon EO Support   
  Not noted   
    
> 0.0001 ft 
candles 
Landing 
craft   
MODIFIED SURF 
INDEX < 8 8 to 10 > 10 
Landing 
craft     Not noted   
WAVE BREAKER 
HEIGHTS < 5 ft 5-12 ft > 12 ft 
Landing 




WAVE PERIOD > 7 s 6-7 s < 6 s 
Landing 
craft     Noted   
SEAS 
< 3 ft 3-5 ft > 5 ft 
Divers, Mine 




ships at sea. Cantu 
(2001) found 5% 
of a set of aircraft 
mishaps related to 
combined sea 




especially for the 
probability of seas 
> 12 ft both by 






Seas forecasts (i.e., significant 
wave height and/or combined 
wind and swell) desired to have 
an accuracy of ~1 ft. Extensive 
efforts have been made by NRL 
MMD and others, including 
development of a Wavewatch III 
model field derived from the 
human forecaster generated 
tropical cyclone track. 
< 3 ft 3-6 ft > 6 ft 
Mine 
sweeping   
< 6 ft 6-8 ft > 8 ft 
ASUW   
CURRENT 
  1-2 kts > 2 kts 
Divers   
  














Survey on METOC Product Effectiveness Conducted at Naval Postgraduate School: 
 
1. Are you familiar with Joint Publications 3-59 Meteorological and Oceanographic 
Operations, Appendix G (METOC impacts to selected operations)? [Respondents 
could select “Yes” or “No” from a drop-down menu] 
2. If you are not familiar with JP 3-59, please review the attachment contained in 
the email [invitation to survey]. Do you agree with the parameters listed for your 
job specialty? If no, what parameters do you not agree with? [comment section 
available] 
3. Did the forecast you received for your mission include these parameters? 
[Respondents could select “Yes” or “No” from a drop-down menu] 
4. Within the past five years, did your job include the usage of METOC products? 
[Respondents could select “Yes” or “No” from a drop-down menu] 
5. Based on the previous question, in the text box provided specify the level of 
command the job was performed at. [Drop-down menu with choices of O-3, O-5, 
O-6, or O-8 level command] 
6. Based on previous questions, please answer the following: [Respondents could 
select “Strongly Agree”, “Agree”, “Neutral”, “Disagree”, or “Strongly Disagree” 
from a drop-down menu] 
a. The METOC products were useful. 
b. METOC products and forecasts are accurate. 
c. The forecasts I received accurately predicted the weather I encountered. 
d. Forecast accuracy impacts my operations. 
e. Operational planning depends upon available METOC products. 
f. The lead time of the forecasts was sufficient. 
g. A longer lead time for forecasting will benefit operations. 
h. Longer forecasting lead time, but with greater uncertainty, is acceptable. 
7. What was the lead time for the forecast you received? [Respondents could select 
“less than 6 hours”, “between 6 and 12 hours”, “between 12 hours and 24 
hours”, or “greater than 24 hours” from a drop-down menu] 
8. Based on the previous answer, was the lead time sufficient? [Respondents could 
select “Yes” or “No” from a drop-down menu] 
9. If a forecast was available at a longer lead time, would you use it? How far in 
advance?   [Respondents could select “Yes” or “No” from a drop-down menu, and 
there was a space provided for comments] 
10. Would you use a forecast with a longer lead if the information carried more 




11. Based on the previous question, how uncertain can a forecast be before it is no 
longer useful? [Respondents could select “Extremely Inaccurate”, “Very 
Inaccurate”, “Moderately Inaccurate”, “Slightly Inaccurate”, or “Inaccurate” from 
a drop-down menu] 
12. What is the latest you can receive accurate METOC products before it 
significantly disrupts planned operations? Please respond in terms of days. 
[Respondents could select from 1-30 days from a drop-down menu] 
13. What was the most useful METOC product you have received for your 
operation? [A space was provided for comments] 
14. What was the least useful METOC product you have received for your operation? 
[A space was provided for comments] 
15. Do you have any additional thoughts, anecdotes, complaints or other items in 
regards to METOC support? [A space was provided for comments] 
16. Have you had formal Meteorology and/or Oceanography (METOC) training from 
the military or separate education, to include space weather? If yes, please 
indicate which one. [Check-boxes were provided for Meteorology, Oceanography, 
and Space Weather] 
17. Additional metadata questions were included on branch of service, highest rank, 
years of military service, whether the respondent had ever held command, and if 
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